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NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE AS A METHOD
OF ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
The growing concern over preservation of natural and wild-
life resources in the United States has resulted in a search for ef-
fective statutory and judicial methods of protecting our enviro-
mental reserves. Because of the importance of waters and wetland
areas to ecological preservation, they have become focal points in
the battle for environmental protection.
Within navigable waterways, the regulatory power of the state
is navigational servitude (or, alternately, navigation servitude).'
The power of navigational servitude for the control of navigation
and the protection of navigable waterways was developed in the
English common law and imported to this country as an attribute
of colonial power.2 After the American Revolution, the power of
navigational servitude was retained in the federal government by
the Commerce Clause3 and in the states as one of the reserved pow-
ers of the tenth amendment.4 In recent years state and federal
courts and legislatures have been attempting to forge the power of
navigational servitude into an effective weapon for conservation.
This Comment will discuss the power of navigational servitude and
its relationship to this environmental, protective purpose.
I. THE NATURE OF THE DOCTRINE OF NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE
"Navigational servitude" is the name given to the exercise of
the state's police powers in navigable waters.5 In addition to
characteristics peculiar to the doctrine itself, navigational servitude
possesses the attributes of police powers in general. Like all police
powers, the focus of its concern is the regulation of public health,
welfare, and safety."
1. E.g., Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251
(1915) (navigational servitude); United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land in
Contra Costa County, Calif., 53 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (navigation
servitude).
2. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
3. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Fifty Foot Right of Way in Bayonne, N.J., 337 F.2d 956, passim (3d Cir.
1964).
4. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
5. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915).
6. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
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The doctrine of navigational servitude grew out of a need to
maintain the navigability of commercial waterways and to preserve
commercial fisheries.7 In performing these protective functions,
the primary governmental activities in navigable waters are the
clearing of obstructions,8 the improvement of channels,9 the con-
truction and maintenance of wharves and harbors,10 and the regu-
lation of fishing."' While conducting these operations in navigable
waters, the state in the exercise of its police power does not have to
compensate for any taking of property, as long as there is no physi-
cal encroachment on riparian or littoral lands.'
2
Both the state and federal governments possess the power of
navigational servitude. In waters navigable in the federal sense,
federal regulations control, but in the absence of such regulations,
the states have full dominion in their waterways.'" Two basic qual-
ifications must be met before the powers of navigational servitude
are invoked by either government: (1) the particular body of wa-
ter under consideration must qualify as navigable (or some equiva-
lent term);14 and (2) the particular problem under consideration
must relate to navigation in such a way that the application of navi-
gational servitude is appropriate. 15
A. Federal Navigational Servitude
Federal application of the doctrine of navigational servitude
takes place only in waterways which conform to the federal stan-
dards of navigability. These standards were established in The
Daniel Ball v. United States,'" an 1870 admiralty decision involv-
ing a ship which carried cargo only on a tributary of Lake Michigan.
73 F.2d 555, 562 (1934). For a general discussion of the limitations on the
police power, see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
7. See, e.g., Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251
(1915); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173
N.E.2d 273 (1961).
8. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915).
9. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 419 (1964).
10. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 408, 451 (1964).
11. Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173
N.E.2d 273 (1961).
12. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
13. Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 BUFF. L.
REV. 399 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Trelease].
14. E.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940);
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
15. E.g., United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940)
(construction of hydroelectric dam); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improve-
ment Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961) (dredging operations).
16. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
The ship's owners contended that since the tributary itself was not
an interstate stream, they should not be subjected to a shipping tax.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the tributary was part of
the navigable waters of the United States. The Court described
navigable waters as follows:
[T] hey are navigable in fact when they are used, or are sus-
ceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as high-
ways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel
on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States ... when they form in their ordinary condi-
tion by themselves or by uniting with other waters a con-
tinued highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other states or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
17
This definition of navigable waters has remained the standard
for decision, although questions have arisen in elaborating its spe-
cific terms, e.g. "highways for commerce,"18 "by themselves or by
uniting with other waters."1 9 Qualifications for navigability have
included the capacity to support light draft boating or to float logs
in commerce.20 A stream once considered non-navigable under the
standards of The Daniel Ball may be reclassified upon a decision
that it can be made navigable.2 1 With each watercourse, the ques-
tion of navigability is one of fact involving that waterway alone.
The basic limitations on the use of the navigational police power
were set forth by the Supreme Court in 1925 in United States v.
River Rouge Co.:22
And while Congress, in the exercise of this power, may
adopt, in its judgment, any means having some positive re-
lation to the control of navigation and not otherwise incon-
sistent with the Constitution, it may not arbitrarily destroy
or impair the rights of riparian owners by legislation which
has no real or substantial relation to the control of naviga-
tion or appropriateness to that end [citation omitted] .23
In River Rouge, a navigational, rather than a commercial, basis
for the application of navigational servitude is described. In recent
years this concept has been enlarged by decisions which state that
the commercial need for hydroelectric power may also justify im-
17. Id. at 563.
18. United States v. Wishkah Boom Co., 136 F. 42 (9th Cir. 1905)
(which declared a stream navigable because it was the only outlet for a
town upriver).
19. E.g., United States v. Ross, 74 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (dis-
cussing the status of sloughs).
20. Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781 (8th Cir. 1906); United States v.
Wishkah Boom Co., 136 F. 42 (9th Cir. 1905).
21. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (a
stream was reclassified because of its newly discovered potential as a
source of hydroelectric power).
22. 269 U.S. 411 (1925) (company sought compensation for its loss of
access to the river).
23. Id. at 419.
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position of the federal servitude.2 4 In language redefining the rule
(and distinguishing River Rouge) the Supreme Court remarked in
United States v. Appalachian Power Co.: 2
5
In our view, it cannot properly be said that the constitu-
tional power of the United States over its waters is limited
to control for navigation .... In truth, the authority of
the United States is the regulation of commerce upon its
waters. Navigation, in the sense stated [in River Rouge],
is but a part of the whole. Flood protection, watershed de-
velopment, recovery of the cost of improvement through
the utilization of power are likewise parts of commercial
control .... That authority is as broad as the needs of
commerce.
26
Not all courts, however, have interpreted the powers of navi-
gational servitude to be as broad as those described above.27 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discounted such expansive
languge in rejecting the extension of this doctrine to the appro-
priation of submerged lands for the laying of an oil pipeline:
Statements in the later cases seem to broaden the rule set
forth in the River Rouge case and permit the United States,
without the paying of just compensation, to exercise its
dominant servitude in navigable waters in the interest of
commerce and not just navigation. However, we think that
the rule announced in River Rouge is still law. The case,
United States v. Appalachian Power Co. [citation omitted]
is not to the contrary.2 s
In spite of such resistance, the basis for federal application of
the doctrine of navigational servitude seems to be shifting from
the power to maintain navigability to the power to encourage com-
merce generally.
B. State Navigational Servitude
Whenever federal control over navigable waters is not being
24. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1955); United States v. Appalachian Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
25. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
26. Id. at 426.
27. Jackson v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (which
refused to impose navigational servitude for the benefit of certain activities
of the War Department. Some of the opinion was questioned, however, in
Todd v. United States, 292 F.2d 841 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ). Opposition to the
enlarged concept is further shown in Note, Eminent Domain-Taking or
Injury of Property as Grounds for Compensation-Navigational Servitude,
19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1116 (1968).
28. United States v. Fifty Foot Right of Way in Bayonne, N.J., 337
F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1954).
exercised, the state powers of navigational servitude are supreme."
State powers are, of course, not limited to waters navigable in the
federal sense, since state power in regulating waterways is not de-
rived from the Commerce Clause, but from the reserved powers of
the tenth amendment. Nonetheless, navigational servitude in the
states similarly revolves around the two points raised above; the
question of navigability and the appropriateness of the police power
to resolve a particular problem.
The specific tests for determining navigability on the state level
are similar to those employed by federal courts. Opinions may
deal with a stream's capacity as a public highway, 30 its susceptibility
for light draft boating,
3' or its ability to float boats, rafts, and logs.
2
As in federal standards, a waterway need not be navigable over all
its length in order to create public rights upon the channel.
33
Despite the similarity in the particular tests of navigability,
state power in navigable waters is often "considerably wider in
scope" than federal power.34 Seven states have developed a philos-
ophy referred to as the "trust doctrine, '35 by which each state holds
all public waters in trust for its people. The doctrine originated in
Minnesota, which in 1893 declared that waters subject to the au-
thority of the state need not be commercially useful, as long as they
are enjoyed by the public.3 6 Some other states which may not tech-
nically have adopted a "trust" philosophy exercise similar author-
ity,3 7 while other jurisdictions hold to older rules, leading to con-
flicting results in their applications of navigational servitude.38
29. Trelease, supra note 13.
30. E.g., Baldwin v. Erie Shooting Club, 127 Mich. 659, 87 N.W. 59
(1901) (which analyzed the character of swamplands).
31. E.g., Welder v. State, 196 S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
32. E.g., Sterns Lumber Co. v. Penobscot Bay Elec. Co., 121 Me. 287,
116 A. 734 (1922).
33. E.g., Shulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905) (which dis-
cussed navigable waters which merged into a swamp).
34. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 420, 432 P.2d 3, 11, 62 Cal. R.
401, 409 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968) (referring, specifically, to
California).
35. Johnson & Morry, Filling and Building on Small Lakes-Time for
Legislative and Judicial Controls, 45 WASH. L. REv. 24 (1970). Discussion
of the trust doctrine and its conferral of rights is extensive. The seven
states deemed to have adopted the doctrine are Arkansas, Florida, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Washington, and, in part, Texas. Id. at 34-35.
36. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 182, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893) (duck hunters
claimed and were granted the privilege of traversing an arguably non-
navigable lake).
37. E.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961) (private parties
were permitted to navigate across privately owned land). The same re-
sult may be achieved by statute, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 27-620 (1970)
(". . . the public of Indiana is hereby declared to have a vested interest in
the preservation, protection and enjoyment of all public fresh water lakes.").
38. Compare Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass.
251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961), with City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal.
App. 2d 23, 102 P.2d 438 (1940). Both involve beach fronts created by state
dredging operations. In the former, land was awarded to the riparian own-
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Although state governments have extended the doctrine of
navigational servitude for recreational purposes,"0 its most dramatic
extension was for commercial aims in Colberg, Inc v. State,40
where the Supreme Court of California used navigational servitude
in furtherance of bridge construction for a new freeway. The
court rejected a claim for damages from two shipbuilders whose
trade was essentially destroyed by construction of a bridge down-
stream from their yards. The builders argued that the state had
appropriated their access to the river, since their operations were
no longer commercially feasible, and that such deprivation was
traditionally compensable. The court held that since access to the
river was not totally eliminated, compensation was not in order.
41
They further held that the building of the bridge was subject to
navigational servitude rather than eminent domain. A strong dis-
sent by Justice Peters had urged that the court recognize that such
bridges, as part of massive route systems, should be governed by
the rules of highway condemnation. 42 The majority, however, re-
fused to accept this thesis, affirming the right of the state to apply
navigational servitude in constructing riparian structures, even to
the point of eliminating navigability.
48
Because the fifty states have developed different concepts of
the power of the state over its navigable waters, generalizations
about the trends of this development are less easily made than on
the federal level. On both levels, however, conservationists are
urging that governments exercise their authority under naviga-
tional servitude to protect the ecology.
IL AUTHORITY FOR USING NAVIGATIONAL SERVITUDE TO LImIT
ECOLOGICALLY DESTRUCTIVE FILLING AND DREDGING
Alarmed by the deterioration in the quality of the nation's wa-
ters, the public and the courts are seeking ways to preserve the
ecology of lakes, streams, and coastlands. Navigational servitude
ers as an accretion; in the latter, it was retained by the state because the
soil had belonged to the state while submerged.
39. E.g., Wilbour v. Gallagher, - Wash. -, 462 P.2d 232 (1969); IND.
STAT. ANN. § 26-620 (1970).
40. 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. R. 401 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 949 (1968).
41. Compare Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d at 411-12, 432 P.2d at
7-8, 62 Cal. R. at 405-6, with Kerr v. West Shore Ry., 127 N.Y. 269, 27 N.E.
833 (1891), where railroad construction blocked plaintiff's access to a small
bay off the Hudson River.
42. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 426, 432 P.2d 3, 15, 62 Cal. R.
401, 413 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
43. 67 Cal. 2d at 411, 432 P.2d at 10, 62 Cal. R. at 408.
could be a potent weapon in accomplishing these aims by allowing
the state to rigorously supervise any development of submerged
lands.
Threats to the ecology of watercourses, however, are many
and varied, and all of them cannot be treated here. The present dis-
cussion will focus on the question of preventing filling and dredging
operations, rather than on preventing pollution in general. Al-
though both pollution and unrestricted filling and dredging can
have a deleterious effect on the environment, the two are ap-
proached somewhat differently.44 Pollution of the waterways has
long been regarded as a nuisance and is not solely a navigational
problem.4 5 Filling and dredging are more traditionally areas cov-
ered by the doctrine of navigational servitude, and there is more
dispute over the policy of extending navigational servitude to pro-
hibit such activities on ecological grounds.46 Building operations
in shorelands have, unlike pollution, often been encouraged where
they have not created any obstruction to navigation. 47 From an
ecological standpoint, pollution has been attacked more harshly,
possibly because it is the actual cause of ecological destruction,
e.g. killing fish directly, while dredging and filling are more in the
nature of proximate causes which, through a chain of factors, upset
the balance of nature, e.g. eliminating the fishes' food supply and
killing them indirectly.48
With the recognition that alterations in submerged lands may
have the same unfortunate effect as actual pollution, conservation
enthusiasts have turned to navigational servitude to regulate such
activities in the interests of environmental protection. In recent
years they have been making progress convincing courts and legis-
latures first that ecological protection is a valid purpose for the im-
position of navigational servitude, and second that the definition
of navigable waters should be broad enough to include swamp or
marshlands bordering upon actually navigable waters because these
marginal areas support the ecology of the parent stream. These
precedents will be discussed in turn, both on the federal and the
state level.
44. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716-17 (Me. 1970) (a distinc-
tion was made between filling and dredging and the discharge of sanitary
sewage).
45. Authority to control pollution was, however, included as part of
the Rivers and Harbors Act in 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964), The Refuse Act.
The Act prohibits the discharge of "any refuse matter" except certain kinds
of liquid sewage into navigable waters or their tributaries. For a compari-
son of the two forms of control, see THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION NEws-
LETTER, Aug. 1970 (available from foundation headquarters, 1717 Massachu-
setts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036).
46. Compare Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), with State v.
Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
47. E.g., Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1899).
48. Growing concern over filling and dredging is shown in such arti-
cles as "'Mud' viewed as culprit when dumped into ocean," Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Nov. 20, 1970, at 14, col. 1.
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A. Precedents for Federal Extension of Navigational Servitude
into the Field of Conservation
The basic federal authority for controlling filling, dredging, or
building in navigable waters is contained in the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, passed to clarify and strengthen the power of naviga-
tional servitude in interstate waters.49 Section 403 of this law gives
the Army Corps of Engineers discretionary authority to control
filling and dredging in order to assure the continuing navigability
of such streams; to prevent the "creation of any obstruction . ..
to the navigable capacity of any waters of the United States".5 0
As will be seen, enlargement of this authority to include protection
of the environment is derived from two recent acts: The Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act51 and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969.52
Relevant portions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act
provide that any proposed alteration in navigable waters, which
will affect more than ten acres of submerged land, and which is
either authorized or conducted by an agency of the United States,
shall not be implemented unless the agency involved has first con-
sulted the Fish and Wildlife Service and the head of any local
agency concerned with the administration of wildlife resources.
5 3
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 contains similar
language 4 which declares that agencies of the government must
consider environmental factors in evaluating projects and must in-
clude a discussion of environmental impact in all reports. The pur-
pose of the act is "to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony." 55
As yet, there has been little judicial analysis of the impact of
these acts and the particular weight to be given to the recommenda-
49. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-18 (1964).
50. Id. § 403.
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68 (1964).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1969 Supp.).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1964). Consultation should be carried on
...with a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by pre-
venting the loss of and damage to such resources as well as pro-
viding for the development and improvement thereof in connec-
tion with water resource development.
Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (v) (1969 Supp.).
• ..The responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain
the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental aspect
involved.
Id.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1969 Supp.).
tions of agencies consulted. In the fifth circuit, however, the ques-
tion has been raised and answered in Zabel v. Tabb,56 decided July
16, 1970. In its decision the court of appeals gave force to all three
statutes cited above and supported a refusal by the Army Corps of
Engineers to authorize an estuarine fill. Plaintiffs Zabel and Rus-
sell were the owners of shore and submerged lands in Boca Ciega
Bay, near Tampa, Florida. They proposed filling 11.6 acres of this
land for a trailer park, and applied to the Corps for a permit. This
permit was refused and the project opposed as a threat to the
ecology of the bay. Plaintiffs challenged this refusal as an abuse
of discretion.
The landowners argued that the powers of the federal govern-
ment in navigable waters were limited to control for navigation,
flood control, and the production of hydroelectric power. To sup-
port this contention, they pointed to the Submerged Lands Act57 by
which the federal rights in offshore submerged lands were granted
to the states; they noted that the powers cited were the only powers
expressly reserved to the federal government.5 Plaintiffs also had
the support of the federal district court decision 9 which had held
that the Corps of Engineers could reject a permit only on the
grounds that the fill would be an obstruction to navigation. On this
subject, the District Engineer had concluded:
Navigation present or prospective: The proposed work
would have no material adverse effect on navigation. The
surrounding waters are quite shallow and able to support
only limited light draft boating, although the proposed fill
would improve water depths in the immediate area. 0
As a final contention, the landholders argued that to refuse them a
permit would be tantamount to taking their property without just
compensation, since the land was useless without fill and since the
restriction was for a public purpose.6 1
The court of appeals rejected all these arguments. Pointing
to another section of the Submerged Lands Act, 2 it noted that gen-
56. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) rev'g 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
57. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964). Because of state interest in develop-
ing offshore mineral resources, particularly oil deposits, the federal govern-
ment ceded its property rights in submerged lands. Reserved, however
were certain navigational powers:
Nothing in this chapter, shall affect the use, development, im-
provement, or control by or under the constitutional authority of
the United States for the purpose of navigation or flood control or
the production of power....
Id. § 1311(d).
58. 430 F.2d at 204.
59. 296 F. Supp. at 764.
60. Id.
61. 430 F.2d at 215.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1964):
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and
rights in and powers of regulation and control of said lands and
navigable waters for the purposes of commerce, navigation, na-




eral federal navigational servitude is retained.63 The court found
that conservation could be a valid purpose for exercising this
servitude:
The starting point here is the Commerce Clause and its ex-
pansive reach. . . . In this time of awakening to the reality
that we cannot continue to despoil our environment and
still exist, the nation knows, if the Courts do not, that the
destruction of fish and wildlife in our estuarine waters does
have a substantial, and in some areas a devastating, effect
on interstate commerce [citation omitted] .64
In its holding, the court emphasized the Fish and Wildlife Coordi-
nation Act" and the National Environmental Policy Act of 196966
by giving strength to their provisions requiring consultation with
conservation agencies.67 The court pointed out that federal and
local agencies consulted by the Corps of Engineers had universally
opposed the fill,68 and that the Corps' Division Engineer had con-
cluded that dredging and filling "would result in a distinctly harm-
ful effect on the fish and wildlife resources in Boca Ciega Bay.P
69
The landowners themselves stipulated in the lower court that there
was ample evidence to justify a conclusion that the project would
disrupt the ecology.
70
The court of appeals concluded that these factors would justify
refusal of a permit to fill: "[T] here is no doubt that the Secretary
of the Army can refuse on conservation grounds to grant a permit
under the Rivers and Harbors Act."' 71 The court pointed out that
if the acts cited were to have any effect, the recommendations of
consulted agencies must be matters of weight in any decision.
72
In support of this holding, the decision in Citizens' Committee for
the Hudson Valley v. Volpe 3 was emphasized.74 In that case the
New York highway department had applied for a permit to con-
struct a dike as part of proposed Interstate Route 287. Since grant-
ing the permit would have ensured that the entire road would fol-
low a certain route, it was held that the Corps of Engineers must
63. 430 F.2d at 205-206.
64. Id. at 203.
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68 (1964).
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1969 Supp.).
67. 430 F.2d at 209-14.
68. See Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Au-
thority, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
69. 430 F.2d at 201-202.
70. 296 F. Supp. at 767.
71. 430 F.2d at 214.
72. Id. at 209.
73. 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
74. 430 F.2d at 208.
consider the whole context of that route before reaching its deci-
sion. The district court cited a statute similar to the Fish and Wild-
life Coordination Act 7 5 which demands that in road-building situ-
ations, the Corps of Engineers shall consult with the Department
of Transportation.76 Recommendations of that Department would
be matters of weight in any decision of the Corps to grant a permit:
"The Corps in considering the application of the State was not oper-
ating in a vacuum.""77
Finally, the Zabel court dismissed the compensation argument:
"Our discussion of this contention begins and ends with the idea
that there is no taking. The waters and underlying land are sub-
ject to the paramount servitude in the Federal government ....
The endorsement in Zabel of the powers of the Army Corps of
Engineers to consider ecological factors in evaluating navigational
projects provides the basis for federal use of navigational servitude
against environmentally harmful filling and dredging. Further
support for extending the Corps' powers is found in a report of the
House Committee on Government Operations, 9 which was also
cited by the fifth circuit court.80  The report argues for an en-
larged concept of navigational servitude:
For many years, the Corps of Engineers administered the
River and Harbor Act of 1899 with primary or exclusive
emphasis on how the proposed structure or fill would af-
fect navigation .... That restricted view of the 1899 act,
however, was not required by the law.8 '
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 2 and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 196983 are cited in the report, which also
calls for stricter control of filling and dredging:
The Corps of Engineers should permit no further landfills
or other work in the Nation's estuaries, rivers and other
waterways except in those cases where the applicant af-
firmatively proves that the proposed work is in accord with
the public interest, including the need to avoid piecemeal
destruction of these water areas.
8 4
Among other considerations, the Corps is directed to consider the
conservation of natural and wildlife resources and ecological fac-
tors.8 6
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68 (1964).
76. 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (1969 Supp.).
77. 302 F. Supp. at 1089.
78. 430 F.2d at 215.
79. Our Waters and Wetlands: How the Corps of Engineers can Pre-
vent their Destruction and Pollution, H.R. REP., 91-97, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rai. 91-97].
80. 430 F.2d at 213-14.
81. H.R. REP. 91-97 at 6.
82. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-68 (1964).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1969 Supp.).
84. H.R. REP. 91-97 at 6.
85. Id.:
The committee believes that the Corps should place on the appli-
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The report also discusses a further aspect of the Corps' control
of navigable waters. In addition to granting permits, the Corps of
Engineers is authorized to establish harbor lines outside of which
no filling can take place without permission.86 "The Corps regula-
tions state that the establishment of such harbor lines 'implies con-
sent to riparian owners to erect structures to the line without
special authorization .. ".. , ,,7 The Committee Report takes the
Army to task for this "largely laissez-faire policy,"88 and suggests
that the regulations be revised to make these lines "merely guide-
lines;" permits would nonetheless be necessary.8 9
These proposed changes in the Corps' policy and the decision in
Zabel v. Tabb establish a foundation for federal use of navigational
servitude to protect the environment from dislocation by fills and
dredging. State legislatures and courts have not gone as far as
these precedents, but authority for the extension of state naviga-
tional servitude does exist.
B. Precedents for Englarging State Navigational Servitude
As on the federal level, authority for state expansion of the
doctrine of navigational servitude is found in both statutory and
case law. State regulatory statutes are basically of three types:
(1) a requirement for a permit to fill, dredge, and build similar to
that in the Rivers and Harbors Act, (2) a declaration of public rights
in waterways which may not be abridged, and (3) the categoriza-
tion of some activity in navigable waters as a nuisance.
An example of the first type is the Florida statute which was
involved in state ligitation preceding Zabel v. Tabb:
cant the burden of proving that the filling, dredging, or other work
is indisputably in accord with the public interest. The Corps
should be sure that the environment will not be substantially
harmed. ....
Id.
86. 33 U.S.C. § 404 (1964):
. . . Where it is made manifest to the Secretary of the Army that
the establishment of harbor lines is essential to the preservation
and protection of harbors, he may order such lines to be estab-
lished, beyond which no wharves, bulkheads, or other works shall
be extended or deposits made, except under such regulations as
shall be made from time to time by him....
Id.
87. H.R. REP. 91-97 at 7.
88. Id.
89. H.R. REP. 91-97 at 10:
... In reviewing all applications for such permits, the Corps
should comply with the same interdepartmental review and consul-
tation procedures as are used in considering applications for simi-
lar works in waters where harbor lines are not established. ...
Id.
Any private person, firm, or corporation desiring to con-
struct islands or add to or extend existing lands or islands
located in the unincorporated area of any county bordering
on or in the navigable waters of the state. . by pumping
sand, rock, or earth from such waters or by any other
means, shall make application in writing to the board of
county commissioners. .... 90
Indiana, on the other hand, lists the public privileges in navigable
waters which shall not be infringed upon:
The natural resources and the natural scenic beauty of In-
diana are declared to be a public right and the public of In-
diana is hereby declared to have a vested right in the pres-
ervation, protection, and enjoyment of all public fresh wa-
ter lakes of Indiana in their present state, and the use of
such waters for recreational purposes. 91
In this manner, citizens of the state are given privileges which they
may call upon their government to enforce.
The third type of statutory control in waterways is the declara-
tion that some activities in navigable waters are a public nuisance.
Connecticut chooses this method; harbor lines are set up in navi-
gable waters beyond which any encroachment is a public nui-
sance.
92
Flood control statutes, which have a similar preservative pur-
pose, may also provide analogies for ecological protection. Pennsyl-
vania's Flood Control Act,9 ' for example, contains some particu-
larly harsh language:
Any right, grant, or privilege heretofore or hereinafter
granted or given by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in
the bed of any navigable waters within or on the bound-
aries of this Commonwealth, is hereby declared void, when-
ever it becomes or is deemed derogatory to the public in-
terest, or fails to serve the best interest of the Common-
wealth.
94
If analogized to a conservation situation, the right to revoke grants
in stream beds might effectively prevent ecologically harmful fill-
ing or dredging.
State support for the extension of navigational servitude for
conservation, however, has been most notably illustrated in a case
unconnected with a statute, the Washington decision of Wilbour v.
Gallagher.95 In a suit between neighboring littoral owners, the
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.124 (1967).
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-620 (1961).
92. CONN. GxN. STAT. ANN. § 25-7(e) (1958):
Any structure, obstruction or encroachment placed in tidal
waters of the state or any activities carried out incident to the con-
struction or maintenance of such structure or encroachment with-
out a certificate of permission from the commission shall be a pub-
lic nuisance.
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 653-78 (1964).
94. Id. § 675.
95. - Wash. -, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). The impact of this decision is
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Supreme Court of Washington refused to allow defendant to com-
plete filling for a trailer park on the shores of Lake Chelan. Al-
though it was a suit between private parties, the holding was
reached on the grounds of navigational servitude: "We prefer to
rest our decision on the proposition that the fills made by defendant
constitute an obstruction to navigation." 96 The harshness of the
decision indicates the weight which courts give to the protection of
water rights; because navigational servitude was imposed, the de-
fendants were not only left with worthless lands, they were forced
to pay to have prior fills removed.
97
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs' stated complaints in Wil-
bour v. Gallagher dealt with the loss of lake surface for recreational
use, it seems reasonable to assume that their underlying motive in
suing was their displeasure with the idea of a trailer park s8 Al-
though conservational factors were not central to the court's de-
cision, they were central to plaintiffs' grievances. The result in
this case essentially shows how a suit over loss of boating rights can
be used to effect a primarily environmental result.
Wilbour is the most striking precedent for the use of naviga-
tional servitude to conservational ends. Other cases only hint at
such possible extensions.9 9 An example is the 1965 Massachusetts
decision in Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe, Inc.100
That litigation dealt with restraining fill in coastal marshes. Al-
though the court indicated, in remanding for more facts, that it
would be very hesitant to forbid the fill without compensating the
defendant, 101 the justices suggested that their decision might be
altered by more proof that the fill would be detrimental to the
area's ecology and to local fisheries.10
2
In other states, the law of nuisance may provide precedents for
discussed in Corker, Thou Shalt not Fill Public Lands without Public
Permission-Washington's Lake Chelan Decision, 45 WAsH. L. REv. 65
(1970).
96. 462 P.2d at 237.
97. Id. at 239.
98. Id., n.13: ". • . We come to this conclusion with some reluctance,
since there have been other fills in the area about which there has
been no complaint."
99. See Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d
822 (1959) (regulations prohibiting construction in a flood zone were up-
held). But see Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the Town
of Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (striking down a flood con-
trol ordinance).
100. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
101. Id. at 110-12, 206 N.E.2d at 669-71.
102. Id at 112, 206 N.E.2d at 672. They did not suggest this with
much enthusiasm.
extending navigational servitude to include ecological protection.
Navigational servitude is often nothing more than the control of a
nuisance, i.e. the obstruction of public waters. Connecticut, as
seen, 103 expressly declares some activities in public waters to be
nuisances. In other states, such as Indiana' 04 or the "trust states," 10 5
interference in shore and submerged lands is treated as a type of
encroachment and enjoined much in the manner of a public nui-
sance.
1 0 6
Nuisance theory provides some of the limitations on property
rights:
We think it a settled principle, growing out of the nature
of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of prop-
erty, however absolute and unqualified may be his title,
holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor in-
jurious to the rights of the community.
10 7
The early maxim was "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas'-use
your lands so that no injury is caused to others.'05 Following this
principle, it could be argued that the disruption of the ecology by
filling or dredging in waterways interferes with public enjoyment
of the environment, and that such use of land should be policed by
the state under its navigational powers:
With the changing conditions necessarily attendant upon
the growth and density of population and the ceaseless
changes taking place in the method and manner of carry-
ing out the multiplying lines of human endeavor, the
greater becomes the demand upon that reserve element of
sovereignty which we call the police power.10 9
State precedents for the extension of the doctrine of naviga-
tional servitude into the field of conservation are more scattered
and variable than those in the federal sphere. They include a va-
riety of statutes, a few cases, and possible analogies to flood control
regulations and nuisance law. While they lack the uniformity of
federal authority, they nonetheless provide a basis for growth.
On the state and federal levels also, precedents for applying
navigational servitude in the ecologically valuable, but essentially
non-navigable, swamps, marshes, and other wetlands which border
on navigable waters are being sought.
103. See note 92 and accompanying text supra.
104. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
105. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
106. Wilbour v. Gallagher, - Wash. -, 462 P.2d 232, 239 (1969).
107. City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1108, 184
N.W. 823, 828 (1921) (quoting Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v.
Alger, 7 Mass. (Cush.) 53 (1850) ).
108. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(discussing zoning in terms of nuisance control).
109. City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 1103,
184 N.W. 823, 826-27 (1921).
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C. The Question of Protecting Areas Marginal to Navigable Waters
The determination whether shallow, possibly marsh-like waters
adjoining navigable waterways can be subjected to the police power
of navigational servitude is essential in evaluating the potential
force of navigational servitude as a weapon for conservation. The
ecology of these areas is usually linked with that of the major
stream, and dredging and filling of such lowlands is recognized to
have a large effect on the quality of the navigable waterway. 110
Such surface waters, however, have traditionally not been sub-
jected to the public servitude.
Early cases in particular reject the theory that such adjoining
waters should be controlled under the police power. A leading de-
cision is Leovy v. United States."' Red Pass, the area in contro-
versy, included a channel which connected, through a series of other
passes, to the Mississippi River. Red Pass was used commercially
by luggers carrying oysters and for transporting cargoes of willows
and other timber. Leovy proposed damming the stream for the
purpose of reclaiming swamp areas in Red Pass inundated by over-
flow waters of the Mississippi. All commerce would have been
eliminated by such a structure. The Supreme Court held that the
Government had no power to regulate dam construction in the
area because the Pass was non-navigable and because the com-
merce on the stream was intrastate. It also echoed policy values of
the time in declaring that such reclamation of swamplands should
be encouraged, not opposed.
112
Similarly, an 1891 New York case, Kerr v. West Shore Ry.,l"3
limited the definition of navigable waters by refusing to declare a
small bay adjacent to the Hudson River navigable. Because the
bay was not vital to the navigability of the river and was only pri-
vately used itself, the court held that the mere connection of the
bay to the Hudson did not make it navigable."14
Later authority has continued to hold that navigational servi-
tude should not apply in marshy, shallow areas marginal to navi-
gable waters,"' or to small bodies of water narrowly connected to
110. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); Commissioner of
Natural Resources v. S. Volpe, Inc., 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
111. 177 U.S. 621 (1899).
112. Id. at 636.
113. 127 N.Y. 269, 27 N.E. 833 (1891) (plaintiffs sought compensation
when the railroad cut off access to this bay).
114. Id.
115. E.g., Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 852
(Ct. Cl. 1949) (court held the United States liable for damages caused by
such waters:
To hold that the borrow pit, under the admitted facts, is a
navigable water of the United States would be to stretch
the term to include every body of water, natural or artifi-
cial, which has any character or connection with a naviga-
ble stream through which a small boat can be pushed by
oar or pole. We know of no authority to support such a
holding.1 16
North Carolina has applied a strict rule in favor of private prop-
erty rights in coastal wetlands:
Before flats lying between high water mark and the chan-
nel of navigable waters are reclaimed by the owner, the
public and adjoining owners may exercise paramount right
of navigation over them, but if the owner elects to reclaim
them he has a right to do so and if the result is less bene-
ficial to the adjoining owners, they cannot complain. 117
Operations in flood plains have almost universally been held to be
removed from the state's navigational police powers. 118
Certain extensions of navigational servitude into low, wetland
areas adjacent to navigable waters, however, have been made. "Sub-
merged swamplands" (similar to the lands owned by Zabel and Rus-
sell in Boca Ciega Bay)" 9 were deemed to be part of navigable
Biscayne Bay in Miami Beach, Florida, in a 1936 federal decision.
120
The Washington court in Wilbour v. Gallagher recognized an exten-
sion of navigational servitude into waters artifically created over
private land.' 2' The dissents in cases which reject enlarged con-
cepts of navigability also supply arguments for extension of the po-
lice power in marginal areas.
122
The most important authority for application of the doctrine of
navigational servitude to the conservation of traditionally non-navi-
gable wetlands is, however, statutory. Wisconsin, for example, re-
quires that in evaluating requests for dredging or filling permits,
"standards and criteria for navigable water protection" should in-
clude material dealing with "preservation of shore growth and
cover, conservancy uses for low lying lands."'1 23 Judicial interpre-
federal activity in sloughs bordering the Mississippi River, when such
activities caused deterioration in plaintiff's bridges).
116. United States v. Ross, 74 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
117. Home Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 66, 197 S.E.
714, 716 (1938).
118. E.g., Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the Town of
Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
119. Described in Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation
Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965).
120. Miami Beach Jockey Club v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135 (D.C. App. 1936)
aff'g 83 F.2d 715 (D.C. App. 1935) (like the lands involved in Zabel, the area
here was encumbered with plant growth and located near the Intra-
coastal Waterway).
121. Wilbour v. Gallagher, - Wash. -, 462 P.2d 232, passim (1969).
122. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 852, 868-70
(Ct. Cl. 1949); United States v. Ross, 74 F. Supp. 6, 10-12 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
123. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 144.26(6) (1970 Supp.).
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tation of this statute suggests that where investigation shows that
the alteration of marshlands will be deleterious to the quality of a
navigable water, the operation may be restrained.
1 24
Despite the authority for applying navigational servitude for
conservational ends, arguments have been advanced opposing its
use. The most common criticism of utilizing navigational servitude
in such instances holds that such restrictions on the use of prop-
erty should be compensated.
III. FACTORS RESTRAINING THE EXPANSION OF NAVIGATIONAL
SERVITUDE: THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION
Like all police powers, 25 the doctrine of navigational servi-
tude comes under its greatest attack as a taking of property without
just compensation. Private parties have been granted substantial
property rights in submerged lands, despite their subjection to fed-
eral and/or state servitude. 26  Courts, whether discussing navi-
gational servitude or the police power in general, may limit state
intervention in navigable waters because of these rights. The
words of Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon127 are
often cited:
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an im-
plied limitation and must yield to the police power. But
obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or
the contract and due process clauses are gone.'
28
As discussed in section I of this Comment, the application of
navigational servitude in any situation depends upon two factors:
(1) whether the end to be achieved by its application is a proper
purpose for the use of navigational servitude, and (2) whether the
waterway involved is properly subject to navigational servitude.
The question of compensation injects itself into both of these is-
sues.
124. See Reuter v. Department of Natural Resources, Div. of Resource
Dev., - Wis. -, 168 N.W.2d 860, 862 (1969) (requiring facts on "the sub-
stantiality of effect of water pollution" to be caused by filling in marsh-
land).
125. E.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
126. E.g., Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass.
251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961); Home Real Estate & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214
N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1931).
127. 260 U.S. 393 (1919).
128. Id. at 413 (Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, held that a
regulation prohibiting coal mining within city limits was invalid as a
taking without compensation, despite the fact, emphasized in Justice Bran-
deis' dissent, that the regulation was necessary to ensure surface support).
A. Opposition to Conservation Uses of Navigational Servitude
An unwillingness to use navigational servitude to protect the
ecological balance of waterways where private lands are involved
is reflected in recent decisions in Maine and Massachusetts. Faced
with a fact situation similar to that in Zabel, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine held in State v. Johnson129 that to refuse appellants
a license to fill would be to deny them due process. Like the plain-
tiffs in Zabel, the Johnsons were owners of estuarine lands-a por-
tion of the Wells Marshes which was "flooded at high tide and
drained, upon receding tide, into the River by a network of what
our Maine historical novelist Kenneth E. Roberts called 'eel runs'
" ..,,130 A permit to fill this land for sale to home-builders was re-
fused on ecological grounds by the Maine Wetlands Control Board
under the authority of Maine's Wetlands Control Act.131 The lower
court had concluded, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
agreed, that the marshland was a "valuable natural resource of the
state and plays an important role in the conservation of aquatic
and marine life, game birds and waterfowl. ' 132 They also recog-
nized that the ecological balance of the coastlands might be upset
by the fill. However, the court held that
[t]o leave appellants with commercially valueless land in
upholding the restrictions presently imposed, is to charge
them with more than their just share of the cost of this
state-wide conservation program, granting fully its com-
mendable purpose.
133
In rejecting the state's application of police power in this case,
the Maine court did not deal directly with the question of naviga-
tional servitude. Authorities cited as contrary to the court's hold-
ing, however, involved navigational servitude,13 4 so that the court
was undoubtedly aware of its potential powers. The court chose
instead to analogize the Wetlands Act'3 5 to zoning ordinances, and
in the light of such precedents,'3 6 found that the law as it was ap-
plied in this case was "both an unreasonable exercise of the police
power and equivalent to taking within constitutional considera-
129. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
130. Id. at 713.
131. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709 (1970 Supp.):
... No person, agency, or municipality shall remove, fill, dredge or
drain sanitary sewage into, or otherwise alter any coastal wetland
. ..[without filing plans with the Board].
Id. § 4701.
132. 265 A.2d at 714.
133. Id. at 716.
134. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1914)
(ordering removal of a wharf from navigable waters); Miami Beach
Jockey Club v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135 (D.C. App. 1936) (prohibiting fill in sub-
merged lands) (cited in State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d at 715).
135. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709 (1970 Supp.).
136. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1919); Morris
Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539,





A similar decision was reached in Massachusetts in Commiss-
sioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe, Inc. 138 The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court of Massachusetts reversed for determination of further
facts related to the effect of coastal fill,1" 9 but the court was
strongly of the opinion that a refusal by the Commissioner to permit
filling would be violative of due process, despite a finding by the
director of marine fisheries that prevention of the fill was neces-
sary "in the interest of protecting marine fisheries and maintain-
ing the ecological components of this estuarine complex in their
present protective form. 140 The court recognized the pre-eminent
power of the state to protect its fisheries, but concluded that this
power did not extend to a regulation eliminating the entire value
of defendant's property. Although willing to listen to further ar-
gument on the ecological effect of the fill, the court clearly felt
that this was a situation where compensation would be necessary.
141
Like the authority for Johnson, authority cited in support of
Volpe dealt mainly with zoning cases. Both Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon'142 and Averne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher,143 the
primary authorities discussing the need for compensation in some
regulatory situations, were relied upon. The main authority
cited in both Volpe and Johnson, however, was Morris Land Im-
provement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,144 a 1963 New
Jersey case, which involved the zoning of swampland for conserva-
tion purposes. The area was to be preserved for a wildlife shelter
and for flood water retention, restrictions on use which made the
land commercially useless: "[A] l in all, about the only practical
use which can be made of property in the zone is a hunting or fish-
ing preserve or a wildlife sanctuary, none of which can be consid-
ered productive." 145 Because the property owner would be left
with valueless land if the zoning ordinance were upheld, and be-
cause the restrictions imposed "had for their prime object the re-
tention of the land substantially in its natural state, essentially for
137. 265 A.2d at 716.
138. 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
139. Id. at 111-12, 206 N.E.2d at 671-72.
140. Id. at 110, 206 N.E.2d at 668.
141. Id. at 111, 206 N.E.2d at 671 ("An unrecognized taking is worse
than confiscation." The court indicated that if the land could be put to
no use without filling, compensation would be required).
142. 260 U.S. 393 (1919).
143. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
144. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
145. Id. at 551, 193 A.2d at 240.
a public purpose,"'146 the court held the regulation to be invalid.147
By analogizing to zoning ordinances, the courts in Volpe and
Johnson treat the respective regulations involved as restrictions on
the use of land, 148 not as applications of the state's navigational po-
lice power. The application of navigational servitude has tradi-
tionally been limited to ensuring the continuance of navigational
commerce; zoning has a broader spectrum of recognized public pur-
poses, one of them conservation.
B. Questions of Navigability
Extension of navigational servitude to protect shallow, possibly
marshlike lands is also held back by the issue of compensation, as
illustrated in the New Hampshire case of Sibson v. State.149 That
controversy arose under a statute requiring state approval for any
filling in tidal marshes.150 Appellant Sibson wished to fill salt
marshlands near Rye Harbor State Park. The court recognized
the power of navigational servitude:
The rights of littoral owners on public waters are always
subject to the paramount right of the state to control them
reasonably in the interest of navigation, fishing, and other
public purposes.' 5'
The court concluded, however, that in applying state servitude to
marshlands beyond the littoral area, the state's actions were "of
doubtful constitutionality" because they granted no compensa-
tion.15 2 Neither the salinity of the water nor any interrelation be-
tween marsh and marine ecology justified imposing the naviga-
tional police power beyond lands littoral to the ocean.
Few other cases have dealt with this particular point, although
it seems possible that part of the unwillingness of the Volpe court to
impose navigational servitude was because the area in question was
marshland rather than submerged lands. Generally, however, as
previously discussed in this Comment, 53 there is little authority
for extension of navigational servitude into marginal wetlands even
without opposition through the compensation argument presented
above.
146. Id. at 551, 193 A.2d at 239.
147. Id. at 557-59, 193 A.2d at 242-4.
148. Zoning as a force regulating the use of land is discussed in Gold-
blatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
149. - N.H. -, 259 A.2d 397 (1969).
150. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 483A(1) (1955):
• . . No person shall excavate, remove, fill, or dredge any bank,
flat, marsh, or swamp in and adjacent to tidal waters without
written notice of his intention being filed. ...
Since amended to read "any waters of the state." Id. § 483A(1) (1970
Supp.).
151. 259 A.2d at 399.
152. Id. at 399-400.




When courts indicate that they will not use navigational servi-
tude to prevent filling and dredging in or near navigable waters,
they are not denying the authority of the state to prevent the alter-
ation of shorelands, but merely pointing out that this must be
done with compensation, i.e., through eminent domain. Eminent
domain, in contrast with the police power, requires that where some
aspect of private conduct is regulated for the public good, compen-
sation must be given:
[I] t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result were
it held that "if the government refrains from absolute con-
version of real property to the uses of the public," it can
destroy its value entirely . . . without making any com-
pensation, because in the narrowest sense of the word, it is
not taken for the public use.
154
In analyzing a fact situation to see whether eminent domain or
the police power is appropriate to enforce any regulation, courts
look to see whether the benefit gained from the prohibition of cer-
tain activities is proportional to the loss suffered by the property
owner.15 5 "The decisive consideration is whether the owner of
damaged property if uncompensated would contribute more than
his fair share to the public undertaking."'1 56 Such a standard, of
course, contains several variables. The case for eminent domain
over police power is much stronger where all productive use of
land will be lost through some regulation:
And, if a property owner be unable, permanently, to use
his property for any of the permitted purposes, and is
therefore deprived of all beneficial use thereof, . . he may
successfully attack the validity of the ordinance as a taking
of his property without compensation.'5
Another variable in the standard of analysis is the extent to
which the activity forbidden is harmful to the community. Whether
or not all beneficial use of property is lost, "[n] o man may right-
fully do that which the law-making power, upon reasonable
grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general welfare."'158
The extent of the benefit conferred upon the public through a
154. Pumpelly v. Green, 79 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (ordered
compensation for the periodic flooding of plaintiff's lands).
155. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1919).
156. Frankel v. City of Baltimore, 223 Md. 97, 101, 162 A.2d 447,
451 (1960) (ordering the issuance of a building permit on the grounds that a
zoning ordinance was too restrictive).
157. Id.
158. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887) (appellants asked com-
pensation after prohibition regulations put their brewery out of business).
regulation of property is generally not a factor in choosing between
eminent domain and the police power. The Volpe court pointed
this out:
The plaintiffs argue as though all that need be done is to
demonstrate a public purpose and then no regulation in the
interests of conservation is too extreme .... An unrecog-
nized taking in the guise of regulation is worse than con-
fiscation.159
The major drawbacks to the use of navigational servitude for
protection of the ecology are the arguments that compensation
should be given and that eminent domain is a more appropriate
weapon against private alteration of valuable shorelands. One
other difficulty in the use of navigational servitude should also be
mentioned briefly.
D. Standing to Sue and Unequal Application of the Police Power
The question of parties can be viewed from two angles, the
party bringing suit and the party being sued. Although the power
of navigational servitude is essentially a governmental function, it
can in some instances be invoked by private parties. With the de-
cision in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission,16 0 the way has been opened for conservation groups
to charge abuse of discretion against administrative agencies in-
volved in the development of water resources. They could perhaps
force the Corps of Engineers to consider environmental factors
which had been overlooked or dismissed.' 6 ' In Connecticut, where
certain actions in waterways are a public nuisance,' 16 2 private par-
ties may at least urge the Attorney General to seek an injunction.
In the trust states, private parties may bring suit to protect their
individual rights in the navigable waterway.10
In the latter situation, however, problems may arise through
unequal enforcement of the private rights. In Wilbour v. Gallag-
her, where neighboring littoral owners were involved in a suit to
restrain filling in the lake, the court noted in relation to its order
enjoining the fills: "We come to this conclusion with some reluc-
tance since there have been other fills in the neighborhood about
which there has been no complaint.' 1 64 The court regretted the
lack of other parties:
We are concerned at the absence of any representation in
159. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe, Inc., 349 Mass.
104, 110, 206 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1965).
160. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Con-
servation groups were permitted to challenge the Commission's decision
because the nature of their organization gave them standing to sue.
161. For a discussion of the Corps' power see notes 84-89 and accom-
panying text supra.
162. See note 92 supra.
163. Wilbour v. Gallagher, - Wash. -, 462 P.2d 232, passim (1969).
164. Id. at 239, n.13.
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this action by the Town or City of Chelan or of the State
of Washington, all of whom would seem to have some in-
terest and concern in what, if any, and where, if at all,
fills and structures are to be permitted (and under what
conditions) between the upper and lower levels of Lake
Chelan.165
The character of the parties may also affect decisions on the
application of navigational servitude to a conservation situation
where it is a government agency that is carrying out the dredging
or filling. In City of Madison v. State,16 for example, private con-
servation groups sought to enforce their rights under Wisconsin's
trust doctrine (a right to the enjoyment of all waters for recrea-
tional and navigational purposes) 167 against the City, which pro-
posed filling for a public auditorium on the shores of Lake Monona.
The court held that since the auditorium would provide a substan-
tial benefit for the whole community, the sacrifice of some naviga-
tional rights was immaterial.' 6
On the federal level particularly, there may also be a conflict
between governmental agencies with regard to the use of navigable
waters. To a large extent, the most massive alterations of the na-
tion's waterways take place under federal aegis-hydroelectric
plants, irrigation districts, etc. At some point, these may come into
conflict with conservation policies. Many groups agree, for ex-
ample, that the ecological effects of massive power plants will be
disastrous. 6 9 It is possible, however, that navigational powers
would not be enforced against them:
Governmental agencies in executing a particular statutory
responsibility ordinarily are required to take heed of,
sometimes effectuate and other times not to thwart other
valid statutory governmental policies.
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CONCLUSION
In analyzing the arguments for and against the application of
navigational servitude in the field of conservation, one arrives at
the issue of whether navigational servitude is the proper vehicle for
165. Id.
166. 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957).
167. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
168. 1 Wis. 2d at 259-60, 83 N.W.2d at 678. Problems may also arise
where it is determined that a local government is not a proper party to
enforce navigational servitude. MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Dux-
bury, 347 Mass. 690, 200 N.E.2d 254 (1964), held that an attempt by the city
to regulate shorelands was unconstitutional.
169. E.g., "Power 'rebellion' flares anew in Yankee hills," Christian
Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1970, at 7, col. 1.
170. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 209 (5th Cir. 1970).
environmental protection, or whether there should be recourse to
the power of eminent domain. To a large extent resolution of this
issue depends on the degree to which conservation is seen as a vital
public function to which other policy considerations should be sub-
ordinate.
Under the arguments of conservationists, the disruption caused
by filling and dredging in the nation's waterways calls for strict
controls. The harm is great enough so that such activities should
be treated as nuisances, uses of land which endanger the quality of
public life. This view is generally supported by the decision in
Zabel v. Tabb.171
The opposing argument, still generally accepted, is that the use
of navigational servitude should be limited to those areas originally
within its sphere, regulation of navigation and the fisheries. While
the power of the state to control its waters for other purposes is rec-
ognized, it is recognized only as a function of eminent domain.
This argument gains support because in the past owners of wetlands
have been encouraged to reclaim them and to develop shore and
submerged lands for residential or commercial purposes.' 72 A re-
versal of this policy, relegating such lands to passive, non-produc-
tive uses, disappoints the legitimate expectations of littoral and
riparian owners. The proponents of compensation point again
to Justice Holmes' opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon:
"[A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.'
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In the end, an analysis of the applicability of navigational servi-
tude to the protection of the environment comes to the conclusion
that the doctrine can be effective and appropriate as long as it is
employed with extreme care. A distinction between situations ap-
propriate for the police power and situations calling for eminent
domain should be made on the character of the activity to be regu-
lated and the property loss to be sustained. Where the dredging and
filling are incident to a project which primarily exploits the shore
and submerged areas and gives little public benefit in return, the
police power may be fitting. Otherwise, recourse should be made
to eminent domain, which can perform the same regulatory func-
tion without depriving the landowner of all compensation from his
land. "In this conflict between the ecological and the constitu-
tional, it is plain that neither is to be consumed by the other."'17 4
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172. E.g., Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621 (1899); Home Real
Estate & Ins. Co. v. Parmele, 214 N.C. 63, 197 S.E. 714 (1938).
173. 260 U.S. at 416.
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